Among partisans of greenhouse gas emissions regulation, the Senate's failure to pass the Warner-Lieberman cap-and-trade bill is often attributed to rampant denial, fueled by diehard political conservatism, energy-company propaganda, and government suppression of evidence on global warming. If so, the solution to the problem is electoral change, exposure of the propaganda, and public education. However, public concern is already so widespread that even leaders of the Southern Baptist Convention have acknowledged the need for action. In this paper, I consider two additional forces that have stymied carbon emissions regulation in developing countries. The first is the perception that costly carbon regulation promoted by the rich will inflict an unjust burden on the poor. The second is hostility to taxation of critical fossil-fuel resources that were developed long before climate risk was identified. My econometric analysis suggests that these same forces have significantly affected senators' votes on Warner-Lieberman. By implication, Congress is not likely to approve cap-and-trade legislation unless Americans with below-median incomes are compensated for expected losses. My analysis supports recent proposals for direct distribution of emissions permit auction revenues to American families on an equal per-capita basis.
Introduction
The climate crisis is mounting, but America is at a standstill. On June 6, 2008, domestic cap-and-trade legislation was declared dead for this term when the WarnerLieberman bill failed a critical cloture vote in the Senate.
1 Even if the next President supports carbon regulation, he will be hard-pressed to ensure Congressional passage before the US delegation goes to the Copenhagen climate-change negotiations eleven months after Inauguration Day. Without binding regulation in the US, developingcountries will simply refuse to accept any limitation on carbon emissions. In summary, we are still headed straight for a climate crisis and the failure of WarnerLieberman is potentially tragic.
How did this happen? Partisans of greenhouse emissions regulation frequently cite rampant denial, fueled by diehard political conservatism, energy-company propaganda, and government suppression of evidence on global warming (Gore, 2007) . In this view, the solution to the problem is electoral change, exposure of the propaganda, and public education. While there is undoubtedly some truth in these propositions, they fail to acknowledge the rapid deepening of concern about climate change -so rapid, in fact, that even leaders of the Southern Baptist Convention have recently acknowledged the threat and the need to act (Banerjee, 2008) .
In this paper, I look elsewhere for plausible explanations. Specifically, I
consider two forces that have stymied carbon emissions regulation in developing countries. The first is a perceived climate of injustice, in which carbon regulation promoted by the rich will inflict a disproportionate burden on poor regions that are not responsible for the problem and least able to bear the cost of solving it (Roberts and Parks, 2006) , The second, in regions with heavy fossil-fuel dependence, is hostility to taxation of critical resources that were developed long before climate risk was identified. This paper uses an econometric analysis of the June 6 cloture vote to test the impacts of the same two forces on proposed carbon regulation in the US.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, I examine variations in income and fossil-fuel dependency across US senators' home states, along with the degree of conservatism in their voting records. Section 3 estimates the relationship between these variables and senators' votes on the cloture motion of June 6, with additional controls for party affiliation, gender, campaign contributions from the energy sector, and an index of state-level climate threats. In addition, Section 3 uses two simulation exercises to assess the independent impacts of states' income, fossil-fuel dependency and conservatism. In Section 4 I discuss the implications for legislative design, while Section 5 provides a summary and conclusions.
American Diversity and Its Implications
Although students of economic development stress the importance of absolute inequality, a broad literature also documents the political importance of relative inequality. Wounded perceptions of fairness can undermine policy reform when it threatens to impose a costly, uniform burden on people whose coping resources are very different (Henrich, et al., 2006; Maslach and Leiter, 2008) . Cap-and-trade regulation provides an example, because it will significantly raise the cost of fossil energy. Poor families spend a much higher portion of their incomes on energy than rich families (IEA, 2008; Table 10 in this paper), and some regions of the US are much more dependent on fossil energy sources than others. At the same time, of course, many Americans are hostile to government regulation on political or philosophical grounds. events, other things equal), but less so from a political standpoint (senators from larger states will get more calls from climate-affected constituents, but they may not take individual calls less seriously than their colleagues from smaller states).
I specify the following probability model to assess the importance of these factors in determining the June 6 cloture vote: (1) 
Model Estimation
I estimate the model by probit for voting senators, predict the yes-vote probabilities, translate these to 1-0 outcomes using a threshold probability of 0.6, and evaluate the prediction accuracy of the model. Table 3 reports results for the core regression (column (1) -income, fossil fuel dependency and conservative rating), as well as selected experiments with the other variables. The estimated coefficients for income per capita, fossil fuel dependency and conservative rating all have the expected signs, and all are significant at the 5% or 1% level. After controlling for these variables, I find no significant effects in any regression for party affiliation, gender, campaign contributions or climate disasters.
The three core variables, on the other hand, retain their significance and impact magnitudes in all the regressions. Experiments with interactions and alternative functional forms for the three core variables did not yield improvements in the regression fit.
Vote Predictions
Using the core regression results in Table 3 , column (1) I translate the predicted probabilities into discrete predictions using a conservative rule that assigns a yes vote to probabilities greater than or equal to 0.6. I present detailed results for correctlypredicted votes in Appendix A. As Table 4 shows, the model predicts senators' votes with 92.9% accuracy (6 predicted votes in 84 are incorrect). Clinton have since stated that they would have voted yes (Eilperin, 2008) . Senator
McCain has also stated that he would have voted yes on cloture, despite his very small prediction probability (0.12). Some question remains, since he added that he would have opposed the bill on nuclear-related issues. However, McCain's strong support for climate change legislation suggests that he would probably have voted yes.
Simulation Experiments
To assess the independent effects of the three core variables, I conduct simulation experiments with all combinations of minimum, median and maximum sample values of state per-capita incomes, fossil fuel dependencies and conservatism ratings. Using the probit results in Table 3 , column (1) I simulate a hypothetical senator's yes-vote probability in each of the 27 cases. Table 7 reports the full results, which indicate large impacts for all three variables. To illustrate the impact of conservatism, the table's first three rows predict yes-vote probabilities for a hypothetical senator with varying degrees of conservatism in a poor state with zero dependence on fossil power. For the maximum conservative rating (100), the model predicts a .16 probability of voting yes. When the conservative rating drops to the Senate's median (30), however, the yes-vote probability jumps to .92.
For the same hypothetical senator from the same poor state, variations in fossil fuel dependency also have powerful effects. To see this, hold the conservative rating constant at its median value of 30 and vary fossil fuel dependency from the minimum of 0 (row 1), to the national median (.69 -row 5) and the national maximum (.98 -row 8). Holding the state's income and the senator's conservatism constant, these changes decrease the probability of a yes vote from .92 to .41, and then to .17. voting probabilities from 0 to .99, with a median probability of .41. Shifting to the median state income leaves the minimum yes-vote probability basically unchanged, but the rest of the distribution shifts sharply upward. The lower-quartile yes-vote probability is now .49, the median .76 and the third quartile .96. Finally, a shift to the maximum income has a radical effect on the entire distribution. Now the minimum probability of a yes vote is .53, and the other quartile points are .99 or higher.
These income results support the proposition that aversion to the regressive cost burden of Warner-Lieberman is a powerful deterrent to a yes vote by senators from poor states. In another experiment, I progressively equalize state incomes and tabulate the predicted effect on senators' votes. In this experiment, I raise the income floor for American states in increments of $5,000. As the floor rises, no state falls below it but incomes in states above it are unaffected. Both fossil fuel dependency and the conservative rating remain the same for each senator. is 55 yes -45 no. Raising the income floor by $5,000 shifts the vote to 57-43;
another $5,000 increase is sufficient to achieve cloture (60-40); another $5,000
ensures a veto-proof majority (68-32); and additional increases to the current maximum income raise the majority to 93-7 and 100-0.
Implications of the Results
My results suggest strong, independent impacts of income and fossil fuel dependency on cloture votes, regardless of senators' relative conservatism on other issues. The results support the hypothesis that the votes of senators from states that are relatively poor and dependent on fossil fuels are strongly affected by their constituents' aversion to the differential costs imposed by a cap-and-trade system.
The political implication is clear: Serious cap-and-trade regulation is unlikely
to pass the Senate without explicit compensation for differential costs. This is particularly true now, since escalating fossil fuel prices have already increased the burden on families with below-median incomes (everywhere for transport, and particularly in states whose power sectors are more fossil-dependent). The most straightforward measure, recently proposed by Robert Reich, would be a direct rebate from cap-and-trade auction revenues to American families on a per-capita basis (Reich, 2008 Assuming a competitive risk-free interest rate of 5%, a CASH certificate with expected future payments of $500 each year could be sold for $10,000, and ownership of CASH certificates would add $40,000 to the liquid assets of a fourperson family.
Summary and Conclusions
In this paper, I have used econometric analysis to assess senators' support for Holding any two variables constant, within-sample variation in the third is generally sufficient to move the probability of a yes vote between very low and very high.
The impact is particularly striking for income, with great significance for the topic of this paper. As the June 6 cloture vote revealed, the Senate cannot achieve filibuster-proof support for cap-and-trade legislation under current conditions.
Undoubtedly, the recent sharp increase in fossil fuel prices has aggravated the situation. Neither fossil-fuel dependency nor senators' innate conservativism is likely to change much in the near term (although a few conservative senators may lose to liberals in the fall election), so there is no reason to hope that these variables will propel a significant change in the voting pattern.
Income, however, is another matter. My results suggest that poor states' aversion to a differential cost burden has significantly weakened support for WarnerLieberman. However, my results also suggest that more senators from states with below-median incomes will support Warner-Lieberman, regardless of their conservatism or their states' fossil-fuel dependency, if direct payments from emissions permit auctions make below-median households better off. Assuming that permits are fully auctioned, break-even for below-median families appears to require direct payments of 30% of total auction revenues. This could be doubled to ensure support, however, while still leaving a vast sum ($60 billion/year for an annual $150 billion auction) to compensate displaced US workers (particularly coal miners and processors) and promote investment in clean technology. The direct payment system could be vested in a trust fund that is separate from standard government accounts, and distribution could be delegated to the Internal Revenue Service. This would be no more difficult than the administration's current $600 distribution to individuals for macroeconomic stimulus.
The direct-payment system would not have much effect on the overall distribution of income, but it would have a powerful effect on the margin where household energy expenditures are determined. Simply allocating a large share of the permit auction proceeds on an equal basis to all Americans will actually turn a large profit for poorer Americans, even after the impact of Warner-Lieberman on energy and fuel costs is taken into account. This will make many below-median Americans absolutely better off and -a critical factor for perceptions of fairness -better off relative to more affluent Americans as well. My econometric and simulation results for income strongly suggest that these payments will shift the votes of many senators whose conservatism and states' fossil dependency would otherwise keep them from supporting Warner Lieberman. Given the urgency of the climate problem, Congress should consider such a direct payment system as soon as possible. Absolute value of z statistics in parentheses * significant at 5%; ** significant at 1% 
